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Abstract. When can quantum information be localized to each of a collection of spacetime
regions, while also excluded from another collection of regions? We answer this question
by defining and analyzing the localize-exclude task, in which a state must be localized
to a collection of authorized regions while also being excluded from a set of unauthorized
regions. This task is a spacetime analogue of quantum secret sharing, with authorized and
unauthorized regions replacing authorized and unauthorized sets of parties. Our analysis
yields the first quantum secret sharing scheme for arbitrary access structures for which
the number of qubits required scales polynomially with the number of authorized sets.
We also study a second related task called state-assembly, in which shares of a quantum
state are requested at sets of spacetime points. We fully characterize the conditions under
which both the localize-exclude and state-assembly tasks can be achieved, and give explicit
protocols. Finally, we propose a cryptographic application of these tasks which we call
party-independent transfer.
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1. Introduction
The study of the interplay between quantum theory and relativity has recently begun a
new chapter with the consideration of quantum information tasks in a Minkowski space
background [1, 2, 3]. For instance, the study of information causality [4] and of causal
operators [5] has given further insight into ties between information processing and relativity.
Along with other results in this area [6, 7, 8, 9], these can be placed into the general framework
of quantum tasks in Minkowski space [10].
One task of particular interest is summoning, defined by Kent [11], where the associated
no-summoning theorem is a statement of no-cloning appropriate to the spacetime setting.
We have also argued that a generalization of the summoning task [6] provides an operational
framework within which to study how quantum information can move through spacetime.
The importance of having such a framework is highlighted by recent subtle questions
concerning spacetime structure and the no-cloning principle in the context of black holes
[12, 13]. Understanding how a quantum state may be delocalized in Minkowski space should
be a useful step towards understanding such fundamental puzzles.
The study of quantum tasks in Minkowski space has been given a second motivation
with the discovery of cryptographic protocols that exploit the properties of either or both of
quantum mechanics and special relativity. Bit-commitment is a well-known example [14, 15];
other examples include coin flipping [16], key distribution (where signalling constraints enter
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Figure 1: An example of a localize-exclude task. A single copy of an unknown quantum state
is initially localized near the spacetime point s, and needs to be localized to within regions
A1 and A2, while avoiding region U1. Theorem 8 shows that this is possible to do.
into some security proofs [17, 18]), and two spacetime analogues of oblivious transfer dubbed
location-oblivious transfer [19] and spacetime-constrained oblivious transfer [20].
In quantum secret sharing, a central result of quantum cryptography, a state is
distributed among many parties such that only certain subsets of parties may collectively
use their shares to reconstruct the quantum state. Other subsets of parties are required
to not be able to learn any information about the secret from their shares. In the context
of quantum tasks in Minkowski space, where the movement of information in spacetime is
central, and in the context of relativistic quantum cryptography, it is natural to consider a
spacetime generalization of quantum secret sharing.
To do this we replace the notions of authorized and unauthorized sets of parties with
authorized and unauthorized spacetime regions. We define the localize-exclude task, where
the goal is to move a quantum state through spacetime in such a way that it is localized
to each of the authorized regions and excluded from the unauthorized ones. Figure 1 gives
a simple example. In theorem 8, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for completing
the localize-exclude task. To argue that the localize-exclude task is a natural spacetime
generalization of secret sharing, we show in the main text that there is a simple construction
that embeds any quantum secret sharing scheme as a localize-exclude task, and that the
conditions of this theorem reduce to those for quantum secret sharing in that case.
In the summoning task one party, Bob, puts in requests for the state at certain spacetime
points, asking that the state be returned at one of another set of points. The localize-exclude
task removes this structure, but adds a notion of unauthorized region. It is interesting to
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also consider a task in the request-return setting, but which includes unauthorized regions.
In this state-assembly task, we consider many parties Bobi who may each request a share
of the quantum state at an associated spacetime region Di. Alice should respond to the
collection of requests given by the Bobs in a careful way: she should hand over a collection
of shares sufficient to construct a single copy of the state when the collection of requests is
authorized, and she should not reveal any information about the state when that collection
is unauthorized. The conditions for Alice to complete this task are the same as for localize-
exclude in the case of causally separated regions, but differ when non-trivial causal structures
are considered. In theorem 13 below, we precisely characterize the conditions under which
this task can be completed, and describe an explicit protocol for completing it when it is
possible.
Together, the state-assembly and localize-exclude tasks provide a rich set of scenarios
to consider. We suggest party-independent transfer as a potential cryptographic application
of this framework, a task where two other parties wish to receive information from Alice
and want the information they receive to be both private and independent of their identity.
We propose a protocol for completing this task which is built on the state-assembly task.
Establishing the security of this protocol we leave to future work.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives the necessary definitions to
study localization to arbitrary spacetime regions and proves theorem 8, which characterizes
the localize-exclude task. We discuss the relation between localize-exclude and quantum
secret sharing in the same section. In section 3 we discuss state-assembly and give its
characterization. In section 4 we study the party-independent transfer task. Two appendices
are included which clarify the relationship of this work to earlier work on summoning. The
first shows that state-assembly is equivalent to a certain summoning task, and the second
addresses the points raised by Adlam and Kent [7] against interpreting summoning tasks in
terms of the localization of information.
2. Localizing and excluding quantum information
2.1. Localizing quantum information to many regions
As a first step towards characterizing the localize-exclude task, we discuss the problem of
localizing quantum information to a collection of spacetime regions, leaving excluded regions
to the next section. To do this, we consider the following setting. Alice holds a quantum
state, which is recorded in a collection of classical and quantum systems held within secure
laboratories not accessible to her adversary, Bob‡. We would like to ask where Alice’s state is.
For instance, Alice might have recorded her state into an error-correcting code and distributed
the shares of this code to various laboratories. Further, she might be constantly rerouting
these shares between labs, so that shares are held only at certain labs between specified times.
‡ Alice and Bob are both agencies, who have many agents that may be distributed to many different
laboratories.
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We can ask where the quantum state is in spacetime by temporarily relaxing the security
of Alice’s labs — we give Bob access to some collection of Alice’s labs for certain time intervals.
If by accessing these labs Bob is able to prepare the quantum state (potentially making use
of later data processing), we say that the state was localized to the collection of labs and
intervals of time Bob accessed. More generally, we can abstract away from the language of
labs and time intervals and give a more general definition.
Definition 1 Suppose one party, Alice, holds a quantum state ρ. Then we say the state ρ
is localized to a spacetime region Σ if a second party, Bob, for whom the state is initially
unknown is able to prepare the state ρ by collecting quantum and classical systems from within
Σ, and then applying later data processing.
Conversely, if Bob is unable to learn anything about the state ρ we say the state is excluded
from Σ. Note that the later data processing referred to in the definition may occur outside of
the region Σ. Further, a state may be neither localized nor excluded from a region if partial
information about the state is available there.
To be more precise we should specify how it is verified that Bob holds the state ρ after
he has accessed Σ. One natural possibility is to introduce a third party, call him Charlie,
who knows the density matrix ρ that Alice initially holds (though Alice may not). After Bob
accesses Σ and perhaps performs some information processing in his own lab, Bob returns a
density matrix ρ′ to Charlie. Charlie then tests if ρ′ = ρ. After repeating this trial an infinite
number of times, we may conclude whether or not Bob is able to determine ρ by accessing
Σ§.
One strategy for hiding a quantum state from Bob would be for Alice to send ρ into a
region Σ, while also sending various decoy states ρd1, ρd2, ... so that Bob, though he may collect
all of the states ρ, ρd1, ρd2, ... is left unsure as to which density matrix to hand to Charlie.
This reveals a finer point to definition 1: a system holding the state Bob is searching for
may enter Σ, but if appropriate classical instructions do not also enter Σ (in this case a label
denoting which system actually holds ρ), then definition 1 says the state is not localized
there.
To avoid confusion around this point we will always have Alice, at some early time,
reveal the classical instructions that constitute her protocol to Bob. The only information
Alice will not broadcast is a classical string k (as well as the quantum state itself). As we
will see, protocols where Alice holds only a secret key k and reveals all other details to Bob
are sufficient to complete any physically possible localize-exclude task, so this restriction on
Alice amounts to a useful simplification of notation and language.
In the protocols we construct Alice will encode her quantum state into an error correcting
code that corrects erasure errors, and then apply a quantum one-time pad to each of the shares
in the quantum code. Alice does not broadcast the classical strings used in the one-time pads;
§ In practice, the protocol would be repeated a finite number of times and Charlie would reach a conclusion
regarding with what probability Bob’s state is within a certain distance of the desired one. Charlie should
set a threshold for concluding that Alice has successfully localized her state to the region.
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Figure 2: Two geometric notions used in the text. a) Two causally connected regions. Two
spacetime regions Σi and Σj are said to be causally connected if there is a point qi in Σi and
qj in Σj such that there is a causal curve from qi to qj, or from qj to qi. b) The domain of
dependence (light grey) of a spacetime region Σ (dark grey). The domain of dependence is
defined as the set of all points p in the spacetime such that all causal curves passing through
p must also enter Σ.
taken together these constitute her secret key k. However, she does reveal her procedure for
putting ρ into an error correcting code and applying the one-time pad, and reveals the
spacetime trajectories of each share in the code. Within this context, Bob reconstructs the
state ρ by accessing a region Σ whenever a correctable subset of shares in the error correcting
code along with their corresponding classical keys from the the one-time pad pass through
Σ.
Definition 1 specifies what is meant by a quantum state being localized to a single
spacetime region. To extend this to multiple regions, we define the localize task as follows.
Definition 2 A localize task is a task involving two agencies, Alice and Bob, specified by
a tuple {ρ, s, {A1, ..., An}}, consisting of:
• A quantum state ρ, unknown to both Alice and Bob
• A start point s, at which Alice initially holds ρ
• A collection of spacetime regions {A1, ..., An}, which we call the authorized regions
Alice successfully completes the task if, after he accesses one of the Ai at random, Bob is
always able to construct the state.
If Alice is able to successfully complete the localize task with regions {A1, ..., An} we say she
has localized the state to each of those regions. The authorized regions may be of arbitrary
shape and may overlap.
To analyze this task it is useful to introduce some language. We give the following
definition which specifies a relation between pairs of spacetime regions.
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Figure 3: An arrangement of two authorized regions that has the minimal requirements to
satisfy the conditions of theorem 5. By the first condition A1 and A2 are causally connected.
This guarantees the existence of a point p1 in A1 which is in the causal future of some point
p2 in A2 (up to relabelling). The second condition gives that each region have at least one
point in the future light cone of s. However, the regions A1 and A2 may be disconnected
(as shown here) and so satisfy this requirement while having the points p1, p2 be outside the
future light cone of s. To localize a state to both regions a maximally entangled state |Ψ〉EE¯
is shared between s and p1. Near to s the state is teleported using this entanglement, and the
entangled system at p1 is sent to p2. Meanwhile, the classical measurement outcomes from
the teleportation protocol are sent to the points in A1 and A2 which are in the causal future
of s. Each region has both the classical measurement outcomes and the entangled particle
pass through it, so the state is localized to each.
Definition 3 Two spacetime regions Σi and Σj are said to be causally connected if there
is a point qi in Σi and qj in Σj such that there is a causal curve from qi to qj, or from qj to
qi.
We illustrate this definition in figure 2a. If two regions are not causally connected we say
they are causally disjoint. In the context of the localize-exclude task discussed in the next
section we will also need one further definition relating to spacetime geometry.
Definition 4 Given a spacetime region Σ, the domain of dependence of Σ, denoted D(Σ),
is the set of all points p such that every causal curve through p must also enter Σ.
This definition is illustrated in figure 2b.
As a first step towards the more general scenario, consider the localization of a quantum
state to two authorized regions A1 and A2.
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Theorem 5 Given a quantum state initially localized near a spacetime point s, the state
may be localized to each of the spacetime regions A1 and A2 if and only if the following two
conditions hold.
(i) A1 and A2 both have a point in the future light cone of s.
(ii) A1 and A2 are causally connected.
Proof. First, note that if an authorized region is entirely outside the future light cone
of the start point, then successfully localizing the state to that region would constitute
superluminal communication. Thus, the first condition is necessary. To see necessity of the
second condition suppose there exists a protocol for localizing a state to two causally disjoint
regions A1 and A2. Then it is possible to construct the state by accessing the region A1, and
by accessing A2. By causality however accessing region A1 cannot effect a state constructed
from A2, and vice versa, so it would be possible to construct two copies of the quantum state.
But this constitutes cloning, so no such protocol can exist.
To understand sufficiency we construct a task with the minimal properties specified by
the two assumed conditions. Such a task is shown in figure 3. There, a point p1 ∈ A1 is
causally connected to p2 ∈ A2, and each of A1 and A2 have a point in the future light cone of s.
However, p1 and p2 sit outside the future light cone of s. Nonetheless it is straightforward to
complete such a task. To do so, a system E is maximally entangled with E¯, then E is brought
to s while E¯ is brought to p1. At s, E is used to teleport the state ρ onto the E¯ system. The
measurement outcome from the teleportation is sent to A1 and A2 from s. Meanwhile, E¯ is
sent from p1 to p2. Each authorized region contains the classical measurement outcome and
the system E¯, so accessing either region allows reconstruction of the state.
We can now move on to understanding localize tasks with arbitrary numbers of
authorized regions. We find in particular that it is only the structure of causal connections
between pairs of regions and the start point that are needed to characterize a task as possible
or impossible.
Theorem 6 Given a quantum state initially localized near a spacetime point s, the state
may be localized to each spacetime region Ai in a collection {A1, ...., An} if and only if the
following two conditions hold.
(i) Each region Ai has at least one point in the causal future of s
(ii) Each pair of regions (Ai, Aj) is causally connected.
Proof. Necessity of the two conditions follows from the same argument as in the two region
case given as theorem 5: localizing a state to a region outside of its future light cone violates
no signaling, and localizing a state to two spacelike separated regions would allow two copies
of the state to be produced.
To demonstrate sufficiency we construct an explicit protocol for completing any task
satisfying the two conditions. To this end it is useful to introduce a directed graph G which
describes the causal structure of the task: for each authorized region Ai introduce a vertex,
also labelled Ai, to the graph. For each pair of regions (Ai, Aj) such that there is a point in
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Figure 4: An example of a task with three authorized regions A1, A2 and A3. (a) The
arrangement of the regions in spacetime, notice that each region consists of two disconnected
ball-shaped regions. (b) The corresponding graph of causal connections, used in the proof of
theorem 6 to construct the error-correcting code needed to complete the task.
Aj connected by a causal curve to a point in Ai introduce a directed edge (Ai → Aj). An
example of a task and its associated graph is given as figure 4.
From the no-cloning theorem it follows that some quantum information must be shared
between every pair of authorized regions. In our construction, these quantum systems that
move between pairs of authorized regions form the shares of an error correcting code. In
particular, for each edge in the graph G we associate one share. In theorem 5 and figure 3
we showed how to localize a quantum system to two authorized regions whenever they share
a causal connection. We can execute this protocol on the shares of our error correcting code
to ensure share associated to edge Ai → Aj is localized to both Ai and Aj. To complete the
task then, our error-correcting code should have the property that, given any vertex, the set
of shares associated to the edges attached to that vertex are sufficient to construct the state.
We illustrate the requirement on this code in figure 5.
In fact, given that every pair of vertices in this graph share an edge, which is guaranteed
by condition (ii), such error-correcting codes have already been constructed. To encode
finite-dimensional quantum systems we constructed such codes using the codeword-stabilized
formalism in the context of a similar summoning problem [6]. Constructions for continuous
variable systems have also been given [8] and then adapted to the finite-dimensional case [21].
In the code-word stabilized construction a single logical qubit is recorded using 2 physical
qubits for each edge in the graph, resulting in a total of 2
(
n
2
)
physical qubits for n the number
of authorized regions.
This result is particularly simple and expected from earlier work on summoning. Indeed,
the conditions for summoning to a collection of diamonds are the same as for localizing to a
collection of authorized regions (see [6], or Appendix A).
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Figure 5: Illustration of the functioning of the error correcting code used in theorem 6. a)
A directed graph that describes the causal connections between the authorized regions of a
localize task. In this case the task involves four authorized regions. b) To complete the task,
we employ an error correcting code that associates a share to each edge in the corresponding
undirected graph. The encoded qubit can be reconstructed from the shares associated with
the edges attached to any one vertex, corresponding to the sets of edges crossed by the purple
arcs. For a single logical qubit, the shares on each edge consist of two qubits. A detailed
construction of the code can be found in [6], and a more efficient version using only one qubit
per edge in [21]. For infinite dimensional versions see [8].
2.2. Localizing and excluding quantum information
Now that we have an understanding of when and how a quantum state can be localized
to many spacetime regions, we can approach the localize-exclude task. This task includes a
notion of unauthorized region, a region in spacetime from which the state must be excluded in
the sense described in the last section. Further, we will require that accessing an unauthorized
region reveals no information about the quantum state. We collect these ideas into the
following definition.
Definition 7 A localize-exclude task involves two agencies, Alice and Bob, and is specified
by a tuple {ρ, s, {A1, ..., An}, {U1, ..., Um}}, consisting of:
(i) A quantum state ρ, unknown to both Alice and Bob
(ii) A start point s, at which Alice initially holds ρ
(iii) A collection of spacetime regions {A1, ..., An}, which we call the authorized regions
(iv) A collection of spacetime regions {U1, ..., Um}, which we call the unauthorized regions
Bob will choose at random among the Ai and Ui, and will attempt to learn the quantum state
ρ from his access. Alice successfully completes the task if both (a) Bob is able to construct
the state whenever he accesses any one of the Ai and (b) Bob learns no information about
the state if he accesses any one of the Ui.
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Figure 6: Four impossible localize-exclude tasks: (a) An authorized region is entirely outside
the future light cone of s, so can’t be localized there without violating the no-signalling
principle. (b) The initial location of the quantum state is in the domain of dependence of
an unauthorized region U1, so can be reconstructed from data in U1. (c) A quantum state
cannot be localized to both the spacetime regions A1 and A2, due to the no-cloning theorem.
(d) A quantum state cannot be localized to A1 without passing through the region U1, since
there is no causal curve which passes through A1 and not U1. The red shaded region indicates
the domain of dependence of the unauthorized region U1. The yellow shading indicates the
future light cone of the start point.
If Alice successfully completes the localize-exclude task, we say she has localized the state to
the corresponding authorized regions while excluding it from the unauthorized regions.
As an initial approach to understanding the localize-exclude task we can list off the
11
A2
A1
|ψ〉
U
x
t Uk
kk
Figure 7: Illustration of the protocol for completing a localize-exclude task with two
authorized regions and one unauthorized region that satisfies the conditions of theorem 8.
In the distant past, Alice prepares copies of the classical string k. She brings one copy of
k to each of A1 and A2 along a path which does not cross U — this is always possible by
condition (iii). She must also bring the classical string to the start point s, and encode the
state |ψ〉 using the quantum one-time pad [22]. The encoded state Uk|ψ〉 is sent to both
authorized regions. Following this protocol both authorized regions contain k and Uk|ψ〉,
while the authorized region contains Uk|ψ〉 only.
most basic restrictions that we expect to apply. First, the two restrictions occuring in the
context of the localize task are still relevant: the start point should have a point from each
authorized region in its future light cone, and there should be no causally disjoint authorized
regions. There are also additional restrictions relating to the unauthorized regions however.
In particular, we can never have an authorized region Ai be contained in the domain of
dependence of an unauthorized region Uj, since then all information which enters Ai also
enters Uj. Finally, the start point too should not be contained in the domain of dependence
of any unauthorized region. We illustrate each these conditions in figure 6. Remarkably, a
localize exclude task {ρ, s, {A1, ..., An}, {U1, ..., Um}} will turn out to be possible to complete
so long as none of the four situations in figure 6 occur.
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As a warm-up to the general case, consider the example given in the introduction as
figure 1. There, a single unauthorized region blocks the path between two authorized ones.
As we illustrate in figure 7, it is nonetheless possible to complete the task using the quantum
one-time pad [22]. Near the start point, a unitary Uk is applied to |ψ〉 with k chosen at
random. To an observer who is unaware of the key k, the density matrix of the state is
ρ =
∑
k
1
|k|Uk|ψ〉〈ψ|U †k . By carefully choosing the set of possible unitaries Uk, ρ can be made
to be maximally mixed. This is possible when |ψ〉 consists of n qubits and |k| = 4n [22]. Once
encoded using the one-time pad, the state Uk|ψ〉 is sent through both authorized regions by
allowing it to pass through the unauthorized region. An access to the unauthorized region
then only sees the maximally mixed state. The classical key k is also sent to both authorized
regions, but along trajectories that avoid the unauthorized one.
A similar technique can be applied to the general case of many authorized and many
unauthorized regions. As we show in the proof of theorem 8 given below, the strategy is
to first encode the state into an error-correcting code so that it can be localized to each
authorized region. Then each share in that error-correcting code is encoded using a classical
string and the quantum one-time pad. We then leverage classical secret sharing to allow us to
get the encoding string to the needed authorized regions while avoiding all the unauthorized
regions.
We are now ready to state theorem 8 and give the proof. The proof of sufficiency is
somewhat lengthy, so we have provided figure 8 which summarizes the key steps taken.
Theorem 8 Given a collection of authorized regions {A1, ..., An}, unauthorized regions
{U1, ..., Um}, and start point s, a localize-exclude task is possible if and only if the following
three conditions are satisfied.
(i) The starting location of the state ρ (a) has at least one point from each authorized region
in its causal future, and (b) is not in the domain of dependence of any unauthorized
region.
(ii) Every pair of authorized regions (Ai, Aj) are causally connected.
(iii) For every pair (Ai, Uj) of authorized and unauthorized regions, Ai is not contained in
the domain of dependence of Uj.
Proof. The necessity of conditions (i)(a) and (ii) follow from the same arguments as in
theorem 6. To argue the necessity of condition (iii), notice that if Ai is contained in the
domain of dependence of Uj, then the state of the quantum fields within Aj is determined
by unitary evolution from the fields within Ui. Then whenever the state can be determined
from Ai it is also possible to determine it from Uj. Condition (i)(b) is necessary for the same
reason.
To demonstrate sufficiency we construct an explicit protocol to complete the task
in the case where all three conditions are true. It is useful to recall the notation
(ρ, s, {A1, ..., An}, {U1, ..., Um}), which describes a localize-exclude task by specifying the state
(or system) on which we must complete the task, the start point, authorized regions, and
unauthorized regions. As a first step in constructing our protocol, we encode the state ρ into
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(ρ, s, {A1, ..., An}, {U1, ..., Um})×1
(Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, {U1, ..., Um})×(
n
2)
(Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, ∅)×1
Teleportation
(kij,−∞, Ri, {U1, ..., Um})×3
(klij,−∞, Ri, Ul)×m
Send string on causal
curve through Ri \ Ul
Theorem 6
One-time pad
((m,m)) classical
secret sharing scheme
Figure 8: Diagram of the sufficiency proof of theorem 8. In three steps, the proof
reduces completing the localization task on the state ρ with n authorized sets and m
unauthorized sets, denoted by (ρ, s, {A1, ..., An}, {U1, ..., Um}), to completing
(
n
2
)
instances of
(Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, ∅) on quantum shares, and 3m
(
n
2
)
instances of (klij,−∞, Ri, Ul) on classical
shares, where the region Ri may be either the start point or an authorized region and the
notation −∞ indicates the share is available at early times. The first step in the protocol is
to recycle the error-correcting code from theorem 6 to encode the state into shares Sij. At
the second step, the one-time pad is applied to each of the Sij. This allows the unauthorized
regions to be avoided by introducing additional classical shares, but without the need for
further uses of quantum error-correcting codes.
the error-correcting code used in theorem 6. Using this code and localizing each share in
the code to its two associated authorized regions would localize the state to each authorized
region. However, here we also need to exclude the state from all of the unauthorized regions.
To do this, we will localize each share Sij to Ai and Aj while also avoiding every unauthorized
region. In other words, encoding ρ into the codeword stabilized code reduces completing the
original task to completing the tasks (Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, {U1, ..., Um}) for every share Sij.
By using the quantum one-time pad and classical secret sharing it is possible to
further reduce completing the (Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, {U1, ..., Um}) task. In particular, at s use
the quantum one-time pad to encode the share Sij using some classical string kij. We may
freely send the encoded share through Ai and Aj so long as the classical string kij is kept
out of all of the unauthorized regions, and is made available at s, Ai, and Aj. Thus, the
task (Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, {U1, ..., Um}) is equivalent to completing (Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, ∅) along with
(kij,−∞, {s, Ai, Aj}, {U1, ..., Um})‖.
‖ We’ve introduced the notation −∞ to indicate the start point is located in the distant past. This is the
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Figure 9: An example of a localize-exclude task and illustration of the protocol provided by
theorem 8 for its completion. Near the start point the state |ψ〉 is encoded as Uk|ψ〉 using
the quantum one-time pad and sent (along the blue curve) through both authorized regions.
The string k satisfies k = k1⊕k2, so that k1, k2 form the two shares of a ((2, 2)) secret sharing
scheme. k1 is sent through A1 and A2 while avoiding U1, while k2 is sent through A1 and A2
while avoiding U2. Consequently, each Ai contains all of the classical shares ki along with
Uk|ψ〉, while each Ui is missing one ki.
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To finish the protocol, we first notice that theorem 6 shows that we can complete any
task of the form (Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, ∅) given that conditions (i)(a) and (ii) hold. The task
(kij,−∞, {s, Ai, Aj}, {U1, ..., Um}) is also easily handled. Note that since the task is to be
completed on a classical string, we can produce three copies of kij and worry separately
about sending the state to s and each of Ai and Aj, so we have to complete three instances of
(kij,−∞, R, {U1, ..., Um}), where R can be s, Ai or Aj. To complete these, encode kij into an
((m,m)) secret sharing scheme¶ with shares klij. Then complete the tasks (klij,−∞, R, Ul).
This completes the task with all m unauthorized regions since the classical string is kept out
of Ul so long as at least one of the shares in the ((m,m)) scheme is.
It remains to complete the tasks of the form (klij,−∞, R, Ul). When R is one of the
authorized sets, condition (iii) guarantees that R is not in the domain of dependence of Ul,
which means there is a causal curve passing through R which does not enter Ul. To complete
the task, simply send klij along this curve. When R is the start point s, condition (i)(b)
guarantees there is a causal curve passing through s and not Ul, so again we can complete
this task.
An example implementation of the protocol used in this proof is given as figure 9.
Earlier we mentioned the similarity of conditions (ii) and (iii) to corresponding
conditions for quantum secret sharing. A quantum secret sharing scheme [23] is specified
by an access structure, with the access structure consisting of subsets of parties deemed
authorized and subsets deemed unauthorized. A quantum secret sharing scheme can be
constructed under two conditions [23]: (a) (no-cloning) no two authorized sets can be disjoint
and (b) (monotonicity) no authorized set can be contained within an unauthorized set.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) of the localize-exclude theorem are exactly these conditions rephrased
in a context appropriate to spacetime.
Beyond this similarity, we can embed any secret sharing scheme into a localize-exclude
task. Consider n parties, Bob1,...,Bobn, who each can potentially access an associated
spacetime region Σi. Take the authorized and unauthorized regions to consist of unions
of Σi’s, so that a full authorized region Ai can be accessed only if some collection of Bobs
agree to cooperate. Choose the regions Σi to be all causally disjoint. In this setting two
authorized regions being causally connected occurs if and only if they share a Σi. Then
condition (ii) of theorem 8, which requires causal connections between authorized regions,
reduces to the requirement that every pair of authorized regions share at least one Σi. This
is exactly the no-cloning requirement on secret sharing. Further, condition (iii) reduces to
no Ui = Σi1 ∪ ... ∪ Σin containing as a subset some Aj = Σj1 ∪ ... ∪ Σj2 under the same
restriction of having causally disjoint Σi, which is just the monotonicity condition. Finally,
to embed our quantum secret sharing task into a localize-exclude task we should ensure that
appropriate task to consider completing on the classical system kij as Alice may prepare these strings at
some early time, before she has received the quantum state ρ.
¶ A ((k, n)) secret sharing scheme is one where any k of the n total shares can be used to reconstruct the
secret while any k− 1 shares reveal nothing about the secret. A ((m,m)) scheme is the appropriate one here
because we want every share to be needed to reconstruct kij .
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Figure 10: Example of the embedding of a secret sharing scheme with arbitrary access
structure into a localize-exclude task. We consider a secret sharing scheme that involves
three parties, and has authorized sets S1 = {1, 2}, S2 = {2, 3} and S3 = {1, 2, 3}, with all
other subsets of parties deemed unauthorized. In the corresponding localize-exclude task, the
three parties become three causally disjoint spacetime regions Σ1,Σ2 and Σ3. Further, this
localize-exclude task has authorized regions A1 = Σ1∪Σ2, A2 = Σ2∪Σ3 and A3 = Σ1∪Σ2∪Σ3.
The start point s has been placed at an early enough time that all the Σi are in its future
light cone.
condition (i) becomes trivial, which we can do by sending the start point s to an early time.
We illustrate the embedding of a secret sharing task into a localize-exclude task in figure 10.
Theorem 8 shows that completing a localize-exclude task with unauthorized regions
requires only the same quantum error-correcting code as used in the case with no unauthorized
regions. Hiding the state from the unauthorized regions can be accomplished using only
the quantum one-time pad and classical secret sharing. This is similar to the approach
taken in [24], where quantum error correcting codes are combined with the quantum one-
time pad to yield quantum secret sharing schemes. By using the efficient error correcting
code underlying our protocol however, we arrive at a particularly efficient construction of
quantum secret sharing schemes. In particular we find that there is a universal quantum
error-correcting code with 2
(
n
2
)
shares for n the number of authorized sets which, along with
uses of the one-time pad and classical secret sharing, constructs quantum secret sharing
schemes with arbitrary access structures. Using Shamir’s method [25], the 3m
(
n
2
)
instances
of the ((m,m)) secret sharing scheme will each require O(m logm) bits, where m was the
number of unauthorized sets. In total, O(n2) qubits and O(m2n2 logm) classical bits are used
in the construction. This provides the first construction of quantum secret sharing schemes
using a number of qubits polynomial in the number of authorized sets. Previously, efficient
constructions were known for threshold schemes and certain other special access structures.
(See, e.g. [26, 27, 24].) Since the number of unauthorized sets can grow exponentially with n,
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the classical bits used can be exponentially large. This is to be expected since it is conjectured
to be impossible to construct classical secret sharing schemes for arbitrary access structures
without consuming exponential resources [28].
3. State-assembly
3.1. State-assembly with authorized regions
In the localize-exclude task, Bob can access any one of a set of spacetime regions. Alice, who
holds various quantum systems within those regions, is helpless to prevent Bobs access. In an
alternative scenario we can have Bob request information from Alice. Alice is free to comply
with the request or to reject it, and hand over no information. Certain sets of requests are
deemed authorized, others unauthorized. Sets of requests corresponding to authorized sets
should result in Alice handing over sufficient information for the state to be reconstructed;
requests to unauthorized sets should reveal no information about the state. Considering such
scenario’s leads us to construct the state-assembly task.
Before giving a precise definition of the task, we introduce a few constructions. To
specify locations where Bob may request the state, we designate certain spacetime points as
call points ci. At each call point a bit bi ∈ {0, 1} is revealed to Alice. To each call point
there corresponds a return point ri. Together, a call point and the corresponding reveal point
define a causal diamond.
Definition 9 The causal diamond Di is defined as the intersection of the points in the
past light cone of ri with those in the future light cone of ci.
If bi = 1, we say the diamond Di has been called to. The causal diamond represents the
spacetime region in which it is possible to both know that a call was received, and to use
this information to influence what is handed over at the corresponding return point.
We can now define the state-assembly task.
Definition 10 A state-assembly task involves two agencies, Alice and Bob, and is specified
by a tuple {ρ, s, {A1, ..., An}, {U1, ..., Um}}, consisting of
(i) A quantum state ρ, unknown to Bob but known to Alice.
(ii) A start point s, at which Alice initially holds ρ.
(iii) A collection of authorized sets of diamonds {A1, ..., An}. Each authorized set consists of
a collection of diamonds, Ai = {D1i, ...Dki}.
(iv) A collection of unauthorized sets of diamonds {U1, ..., Um}. Each authorized set consists
of a collection of diamonds, Ui = {D1i, ...Dki}.
Alice will receive calls at a subset of the Di. If the set of called to diamonds corresponds to
an authorized set, Alice should return quantum systems and classical instructions sufficient
to reconstruct the state at the associated reveal points ri. If the set of calls corresponds to an
unauthorized set, the systems she hands over should reveal no information about the state.
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Figure 11: A state-assembly task with two call-return pairs. A call to c1 is required to result
in the state returned at r1, and likewise for c2 and r2 (indicated by the black lines), while a
call to both shouldn’t result in more than one copy of the state being turned over. This task
is impossible as shown by theorem 11, because r2 is outside the future light cone of c1 and
r1 is outside the future light cone of c2. In the language of definitions 9 and 10, c1 and r1
form a causal diamond D1 (shown in blue), and the authorized set A1 consists of the single
diamond D1 (similarly for c2 and r2)).
Further, no set of calls should result in Alice returning systems sufficient to construct two
copies of the state.
There are a few points to clarify regarding this definition. First, Alice need not hand the
state over at any one of the called to diamonds. Instead, the systems she hands over at
the called to diamonds should together be sufficient to construct the state. Second, calls to
sets of diamonds not specified as authorized or unauthorized may result in the state being
handed over — Alice still completes the task successfully so long as she does not hand over
two copies of the state.
In state-assembly Alice knows the state. This differs from the localize-exclude task and
earlier work on summoning. However, we have also required that she never hand over more
than one copy of the state. As discussed in more detail in Appendix A, this is actually leads
to conditions on state-assembly that are equivalent to having Alice hold an unknown state.
We have chosen to discuss this task from the perspective of a known quantum state however
as it is more natural in the context of the application given in section 4.
Before discussing more general constructions we begin with the simplest state-assembly
task, illustrated in figure 11, and prove a no-assembly theorem. In this scenario there are
just two authorized sets A1 and A2.
Theorem 11 Consider an assembly task with authorized sets A1 and A2 which are causally
disconnected. Then this assembly task is impossible to complete with a perfect success rate.
Proof. For Alice to successfully complete the assembly task, she must have a protocol which
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(i) Returns sufficient information to construct the state when A1 or A2 receive calls.
(ii) Hand over information sufficient to construct at most one copy of the state for any set
of calls.
We can straightforwardly show that any protocol which satisfies the first requirement cannot
satisfy the second, and consequently there is no such successful protocol. Indeed, suppose
both A1 and A2 receive calls. Then since A1 and A2 are causally disjoint Alices agents at
the diamonds in A1 cannot distinguish this situation from one where only A1 has been called
to. By (i) then they hand in sufficient information to construct the state. Similarly, Alices
agents at A2 will also hand in sufficient information to construct the state. Since Bob may
now construct two copies of the state, (ii) is violated.
We see that completing the assembly task to causally separated regions is impossible.
Notice that it is essential that the Bobs may give calls to both diamonds: the possibility of
a call to A1 ∪A2 along with the requirement that Alice allow assembly of not more than one
copy of the state leads to Alice being unable to complete the task successfully.
Next, we look at a wider class of assembly tasks involving an arbitrary number of
authorized sets {Ai}.
Theorem 12 An assembly task with authorized sets {A1, ..., An} and start point s can be
completed with a perfect success rate if and only if the following conditions hold.
(i) The return point of at least one diamond from each authorized set is in the causal future
of the start point.
(ii) Every pair of authorized sets (Ai, Aj) are causally connected.
Proof. To complete the assembly task Alice must localize the state to each region Ai. This
immediately gives necessity of these two conditions, since theorem 8 shows these are the
necessary conditions for localization.
Theorem 8 also gives sufficiency. There, we constructed an explicit protocol that
localizes the state to each authorized region. In particular, the state is recorded as classical
teleportation data and shares in a quantum error-correcting code. To complete the assembly
task then Alice need only hand over the classical and quantum data in Ai when she receives
a call there.
3.2. State-assembly with authorized and unauthorized regions
We can now proceed to characterize the assembly tasks with both authorized and
unauthorized sets that can be completed by Alice. The difficulty here for Alice is different
than in the case of localize-exclude. In localize-exclude, she had to keep the state out of a
region Ui from an attacker who might gain full access to Ui. Now, Alice’s labs are secure,
but the sets of spacetime points corresponding to an authorized call can be overlapping with
those corresponding to an unauthorized call so that locally she may not be able to tell an
authorized and unauthorized call apart.
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Figure 12: Illustration of condition (iii) in theorem 13. Dashed red boxes enclose unauthorized
sets while dashed blue boxes enclose authorized sets. The condition states that every pairing
(Aa, Ui) of authorized with unauthorized set must have either (a) Aa \ Ui 6= ∅ or (b) Ui \ Aa
is causally connected to Aa.
To understand under what conditions Alice can avoid an accidental reveal of the state
to an unauthorized region, we can first consider a task of the form (ρ, s, A, U) having one
authorized and one unauthorized region. In this case, Alice can be successful if either (a)
there is a diamond in A which is not in U , since then she can turn over the state at that
diamond only when there is a call there or (b) there is a diamond D∗ in A which, although it
is in U , is positioned such that Alice can tell at D∗ whether the global set of calls is authorized
or unauthorized. In particular, this occurs exactly when there is a diamond in U \ A which
is causally connected to A. Figure 12 illustrates these two possibilities.
We now state and prove the theorem characterizing the state-assembly tasks with
authorized and unauthorized sets.
Theorem 13 A state-assembly task with authorized sets {Aa} and unauthorized sets {Ui}
can be completed if and only if the following three conditions hold:
(i) The return point of at least one diamond from each authorized set is in the causal future
of the start point.
(ii) Each pair of authorized sets (Aa, Ab) is causally connected.
(iii) Each pair (Aa, Ui) of authorized with unauthorized sets has the property that either
Aa \ Ui 6= ∅ or Ui \ Aa is causally connected to Aa.
Proof. The necessity of conditions one and two follow from the same arguments as in theorem
12. To see the necessity of the third condition, consider that its negation is that both Aa ⊂ Ui
and Ui \ Aa is not causally connected to Aa. Then Alice’s agents in the diamonds of Aa,
should they receive calls, cannot distinguish a call to Aa from a call to Ui since they are
causally disconnected from diamonds in Ui \ Aa. In order to complete the task, Alice must
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always hand the state over to Aa when she receives a call there. She will then also always
hand over the state when the call is to Ui, leading to her failing the task.
To demonstrate sufficiency we construct an explicit protocol to complete the task in the
case where all three conditions are true. Using the error-correcting code constructed from
the graph of causal connections (also used in theorems 6, 8, and 12) we can reduce the initial
(ρ, s, {A1, ..., An}, {U1, ..., Um}) task to many tasks of the form (Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, {U1, ..., Um}),
where the Sij are the shares of the error-correcting code associated to the i−j pair of regions.
To complete the (Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, {U1, ..., Um}) tasks, we encode the share Sij using the
quantum one-time pad with some classical randomness kij. Now notice that we can complete
the (Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, {U1, ..., Um}) task by completing (Sij, s, {Ai, Aj}, ∅) on the quantum
share Sij and (kij, s, Ai, {U1, ..., Um}) and (kij, s, Aj, {U1, ..., Um}) on the classical string.
Stated another way, the use of the one-time pad lets us ignore avoiding the unauthorized
sets when considering the quantum data, and only worry about not handing the classical
string over at the unauthorized sets.
To complete the tasks of the form (kij, s, Ai, {U1, ..., Um}), we encode kij into a
((m,m)) classical secret sharing scheme with shares labelled klij. Then completing the tasks
(klij, s, Ai, Ul) ensures each share klij ends up at Ai, so the string kij can be constructed there
along with the quantum share Sij. At the same time, completing the tasks (klij, s, Ai, Ul)
ensures the share klij is missing from Ul, and since every share klij is needed to reconstruct
the state, the state cannot be decoded there.
To complete these (k, s, Ai, Uj) tasks, recall that by condition (iii) either Ai \ Uj is not
empty or Ui\Ai is causally connected to Ai. If Ai\Ui is not empty, then send k to a diamond
D∗ in Ai \Ui. Then hand over k at D∗ if there is a call there. If Ui \Ai is causally connected
to Ai then send k to any diamond D∗ in Ai which has at least one call point of Ui \Ai in its
causal past. Then hand over k at D∗ if there is a call there and no call at the diamonds in
Uj \ Ai.
We give a task on four diamonds in figure 13 and demonstrate how to complete it using
the protocol constructed in this proof.
The state-assembly task seems a less natural extension of quantum secret sharing
to spacetime, since condition (iii) differs notably from the corresponding condition in
secret sharing. In particular, some allowed state-assembly tasks have unauthorized sets
which contain authorized ones, violating the monotonicity requirement of quantum secret
sharing [23]. In contrast, the localize-exclude task mimics the monotonicity requirement
closely, since the condition there is that (the domain of dependence of) the unauthorized
region not contain the authorized region. However, this distinction from secret sharing opens
up interesting new possibilities; in the next section we propose a cryptographic task and
protocol which exploits the failure of monotonicity in the state-assembly task.
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Figure 13: An arrangement of causal diamonds on which we can define an assembly task.
Define authorized sets A1 = {Da,1, Db,1} and A2 = {Da,2, Db,2} while any set of three or four
diamonds is deemed unauthorized. One can check that every unauthorized set has Ui \ Aj
causally connected to Aj, so theorem 13 gives that this task can be completed. To do so,
the initial state ρ is encoded using the quantum one-time pad and sent towards the pair of
diamonds labelled ‘a’, Da1 and Da2. It should be handed over at whichever diamond receives
a call. The key k from the one-time pad is stored in a ((2, 2)) secret sharing scheme as
k = ka ⊕ kb and ka and kb are sent towards the ‘a’ and ‘b’ pairs of diamonds respectively.
At the ‘a’ pair of diamonds, ka is returned to Da1 if there is a call there and no call at Da2,
or at Da2 if there is a call there and no call at Da1. The kb string is returned to Db1 or Db2
using the same logic. If three or four diamonds receive calls, then at least one of the ‘a’ or
‘b’ pairs of diamonds will not receive a share of the ((2, 2)) scheme, so the state will not be
revealed. Notice that the task is possible even though A1, A2 are subsets of the unauthorized
sets, violating the monotonicity requirement of quantum secret sharing.
4. An application: party-independent transfer
As discussed in the introduction, relativistic tasks in Minkowski space have provided an
interesting set of tools for the cryptographer. In part, our motivation for considering the
state-assembly task with authorized and unauthorized regions is in the hope it will find such
application. The state-assembly task includes scenarios with many parties, and allows for a
rich array of possible causal structures. Each causal structure translates to a set of restrictions
on which parties can know what, and when, and it seems plausible that these restrictions
can be exploited to perform some interesting multiparty task or computation securely.
We suspect there are many possible directions to consider, and make a small start at
this by suggesting below one particular task. We do not offer complete security arguments
for our proposal or careful discussion of the practicality of this task. Our aim is simply to
suggest the applicability of the state-assembly task to cryptography.
To motivate the task consider the following scenario. Alice is an employer who wishes
to hire either Bob1 or Bob2. Alice is known to be inclined to prejudice, and the Bobs wish
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to ensure they are paid based on the work done alone, without regard to their identity. An
easy solution would be to announce publicly the position’s salary, but unfortunately the Bobs
are private people. They wish to keep their salaries secret while also having a guarantee of
fairness. We define the party-independent transfer task in order to satisfy these two competing
needs.
In the party-independent transfer task, we specify that each Bob will give an output Xi
to Alice. Alice will then give an output σ(X1, X2, a) to one Bob, and ρ(X1, X2, a) to the
other, where a is a variable fixed by Alice. The task occurs in a spacetime setting, so in
general the Xi may be stored as several bits handed over from Bob’s agents to Alice’s agents
at distributed spacetime points. The Xi should be distinct. If not, then the protocol aborts.
To meet the needs of our jealousy-prone but private Bobs, and guard against the
prejudiced Alice, we need the transfer to have the following properties:
(i) Party independence: The outputs ρ and σ produced by Alice have the property that
ρ(X1, X2, a) = σ(X2, X1, a) and ρ(X2, X1, a) = σ(X1, X2, a). (1)
In words, we require that the output given to Bob1 would have been given to Bob2 had
the Bobs reversed their inputs.
(ii) Fixed: As a set, {ρ(X1, X2, a), σ(X1, X2, a)} is determined by the variable a only. In
words, the Bobs’ input influences who receives which state only, not which two states
are handed over.
(iii) Secret: Each Bob does not learn Alice’s output to the other Bob. In particular, this
requires that Alice not satisfy condition 1 trivially by having ρ(X1, X2, a) = σ(X1, X2, a)
always.
To assure ourselves completing this task is not trivial consider various naive approaches.
We might have Alice share two entangled sets of degrees of freedom, Σ given to Bob1 and P
given to Bob2, onto which she will later teleport σ and ρ, respectively. The Bobs could then
exchange degrees of freedom if they decide to reverse the arrangement of who receives which
state. This is certainly party-independent, since Alice performs the teleportation without
knowing who holds which degrees of freedom. However, the fixed property is violated, as
either Bob can act on their degrees of freedom before exchanging it.
Another strategy would be to have Alice publicly announce a protocol for preparing each
of ρ and σ. Clearly this is fixed and party-independent, but fails to be secret. Finally, Alice
could separately hand ρ to Bob1 and σ to Bob2 (or vice versa). This would be fixed and
secret but not party-independent.
Although the obvious strategies fail, the state-assembly task seems to be well-suited to
achieving party-independent transfer. As intuition, we can note that in a state-assembly task
Alice’s agents, who only have access to local information and not the global set of calls made
by the Bobs, may not be aware of who has received the state until a late time when she has
been able to collect and compare all of the call data. Further, we have already introduced
the notion of an unauthorized set of calls and can hope to exploit this to achieve the secrecy
property of party-independent transfer.
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Figure 14: Arrangement of call-reveal pairs used in the proposed party-independent transfer
protocol. Bob1 controls the diamonds Da,1, Db,1, Dc,1 while Bob2 controls Da,2, Db,2, Dc,2.
.
Indeed, we can put forward a candidate protocol built on a state-assembly task that
seems to achieve all three security requirements of party-independent transfer. Before
explaining the protocol however, we need to highlight one feature of the ((2, 3)) secret sharing
scheme which will be used. We will use an error-correcting code on three physical qutrits
which stores one logical qutrit. The logical states are given by
|0L〉 = 1√
3
(|000〉+ |111〉+ |222〉),
|1L〉 = 1√
3
(|012〉+ |201〉+ |120〉),
|2L〉 = 1√
3
(|021〉+ |102〉+ |210〉). (2)
One may check explicitly that there exists a decoding operation U †12 supported on the first
two qutrits such that
U †12|iL〉 = |i〉1|χ〉23, (3)
where
|χ〉 = 1√
3
(|00〉+ |11〉+ |22〉) . (4)
By the symmetry in the code, a similar decoding operation exists for any subsystems of two
qutrits. We wish to highlight that after the decoding operation is applied, two of the qutrits
are left in a maximally entangled state.
To construct the protocol, we will use the arrangement of diamonds shown in figure 14.
Bob1 controls the diamonds Da,1, Db,1, Dc,1 while Bob2 controls Da,2, Db,2, Dc,2. We consider
a scenario where the Bobs choose at random which of them receives which state, although
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modifications to this are easy. We divide the protocol into a preparation phase, transfer
phase, and checking phase for clarity in presentation.
Protocol 14 Compensation protocol
(i) Preparation phase
(a) Alice prepares a quantum state ρ, and encodes it into the ((2, 3)) secret sharing
scheme using the encoding given in equation 2.
(b) Bob1 and Bob2 execute a coin flipping protocol. The outcome is not revealed to
Alice. Without loss of generality, suppose that Bob1 wins the coin toss, which
determines that he should receive ρ.
(c) Bob1 chooses at random two of the three diamonds he controls and sends calls to
esch of them. Without loss of generality, we call these diamonds Da,1 and Db,1.
Bob2 then sends a call to the diamond he controls which is not causally connected
to Da,1 or Db,1, which in this case is Dc,2.
(ii) Transfer phase
(a) Alice routes one share of her secret sharing scheme towards each of the diamond
pairs labelled by a, b and c.
(b) Alice responds to the summons at each of the call points by comparing the calls
from Dx,1 and Dx,2. If both have b = 1 or both have b = 0, Alice does not hand
over the share to either diamond. If exactly one of the two diamonds has b = 1,
Alice hands the share over at the corresponding return point.
(iii) Checking phase
(a) Bob1 applies the decoding map to his two shares, producing ρ⊗|χ〉 where |χ〉 is the
maximally entangled state given in equation 4.
(b) Bob2 sends his share of the maximally entangled state to Bob1, who then measures
the pair jointly to ensure he holds |χ〉.
In the notation of our security definition, the inputs Xi by the Bobs consist of their three
output bits Xi = {bi,a, bi,b, bi,c}. The state received by the Bobs is, before the checking phase,
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|A ⊗ |χ〉〈χ|BC with one Bob holding the AB register and the other Bob holding
C. After the checking phase however one Bob holds |ψ〉〈ψ| and the |χ〉〈χ| state has been
measured. We should then identify the states ρ and σ of the definition as ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| and
σ = ∅. If we would like both Bobs to receive some quantum state we can run the protocol
twice.
We can argue for the secret and fixed properties of this protocol. Fixed is clear, since the
receiving Bob can reconstruct his state from degrees of freedom that have never been held by
the non-receiving Bob. Regarding secrecy, we note that the non-receiving Bob receives only
one share of the secret sharing scheme, so learns no information about ρ. The non-receiving
Bob may try to receive additional shares by sending additional calls, but in this case Alice
will notice that calls have been made at two causally related diamonds and not hand over
any shares to those diamonds.
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To argue for party-independence, note that Alice is already limited in her knowledge
of who is receiving the state. Although at each pair of diamonds she knows whether she is
handing a single share over to Bob1 or Bob2, none of Alice’s agents have the global information
of which Bob is receiving two shares, and thus the state. Later on she will be able to collect
information from all the call points and determine this, but at the spacetime points of transfer
this is not known. Alice might try to have one set of shares which she hands to Bob1 and a
separate set to Bob2, but using two unentangled sets of shares for Bob1 and Bob2 will lead to
a failure in the checking phase. We leave proving or disproving the security of this protocol,
which we regard as plausible but not obvious, to future work.
It is perhaps useful to note a connection of classical bit commitment with the party-
independent transfer task. Given a bit commitment scheme which consists of 1) Alice handing
a commitment to Bob, then 2) Alice later handing a reveal to Bob, which he uses to access
Alice’s committed bit, it is possible to construct a party-independent transfer protocol.+ In
particular, Alice publicly announces her commitment to both Bob1 and Bob2, then hands
the reveal to only one of the Bobs. However, it is known that there are no unconditionally
secure bit commitment schemes of this form [30, 31].
5. Discussion
In our first article on summoning [6], we argued that the summoning task gives an operational
setting in which to understand how quantum information can and cannot move through
spacetime. That setting had some limitations however, in that it was restricted to asking if
a quantum state could be localized to collections of causal diamonds.
In this article we have generalized in a way that allows us to ask if a quantum state
is localized to a collection of arbitrary spacetime regions. We have defined the notion of
localized by allowing some party with no prior knowledge of the state unrestricted access
to the spacetime region. If they can later construct the state then we say the state was
localized there; if they learn nothing about the state we say it is excluded. This is consistent
with our previous definition of localization to a diamond, in that completing the summoning
task means in particular that the state was localized to each diamond. However, the notion
of localization implied by summoning is stronger than the notion used in this article, since
in summoning Alice must perform the data processing needed to construct the state while
within the diamond. In the localize task this data processing can occur outside the region.
In the absence of gravity, where there are no known limits on the rate of computation,
the strong and weak notions of localization coincide, at least for diamond-shaped regions.
In the presence of gravity Lloyd argued there is a limit on computational speed [32] but
there are counterexamples to his proposed bound [33]. It is nonetheless plausible that
computational speed is limited by quantum gravity, so one can imagine a scenario where
the quantum state is localized to a region in the weaker sense (in that it is possible to
+ This was pointed out to the authors on the cryptography stack exchange [29].
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construct the state from systems that pass through that region) but not in the strong
sense (in that it is impossible to do so within the temporal extent of that region due to
gravitational constraints on computation). Thus, in the presence of gravity these notions of
localization likely become distinct. Attempts to resolve fundamental puzzles like the black
hole information paradox [34, 12, 35] have also hinted at this distinction, and indicate that
it may be the stronger notion of localization for which the no-cloning theorem applies.
Also in the context of gravity, the holographic bound [36] makes tasks with sufficiently
small regions or sufficiently large numbers of regions impossible to complete, since it places
a limit on how many qubits may be localized to a region of a given area without producing
a black hole. Thus, we should understand the theorems given in this work as applying only
in the absence of gravity. It would be interesting to perform a detailed study of exceptions
to our theorems arising from gravitational physics.
By adding excluded regions to the localize task we have found a natural extension
of quantum secret sharing to a spacetime setting. Indeed, the conditions for completing
the localize-exclude task have close analogues in the conditions for completing quantum
secret sharing, and we can embed any quantum secret sharing scheme as a carefully chosen
localize-exclude task. The conditions on the start point in the localize-exclude task are
somewhat awkward from this perspective, but can be seen as corresponding to certain trivial
requirements in the secret sharing language.
Since the localize-exclude task corresponds so closely to quantum secret sharing, we
might expect that it doesn’t provide any new tools for the construction of cryptographic
protocols. From this perspective the state-assembly task is more interesting, since there we
can have an unauthorized set contain an authorized one. This violates the monotonicity
requirement that occurs in both localize-exclude and quantum secret sharing.
We have given one proposed application that exploits this violation of monotonicity:
party-independent transfer. This proposal is in need of a more complete study. We
have not proven our proposed protocol is secure, nor considered what more practical goals
within cryptography this primitive may be used to achieve. It would also be interesting
to understand the relation of the proposed party-independent transfer task to established
cryptographic primitives. We have already pointed out a connection to bit commitment, but
there may also be interesting relations to (for instance) the spacetime analogues of oblivious
transfer mentioned in the introduction.
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Appendix A. Summoning, state-assembly and localization
In the main article we have discussed two related tasks: state-assembly and localize-exclude.
A third task, summoning, has also been considered in earlier work [6]. All these tasks relate
to how quantum information can move through spacetime; in this appendix we clarify the
relationships among these three tasks.
The summoning task was introduced by Kent [11] and expanded on later in [6]. There
are various variations on its definitions, as we discuss below. We give the definition from [6]
first.
Definition 15 A single-call single-return summoning task is a task involving two
interacting agencies, Alice and Bob. A task is defined by
(i) A quantum state ρ, known to Bob and unknown to Alice.
(ii) A start point s, at which Bob gives Alice ρ
(iii) A collection of causal diamonds Di, each of which is defined by a call point ci and return
point ri.
At each call point ci Alice receives a classical bit bi. Alice is guaranteed that exactly one of
bit will be 1, say bi∗ = 1, and the remainder will have bj = 0, but does not know the value of
i∗ in advance. To successfully complete the task, Alice should return the state ρ to the point
ri∗ such that bi∗ = 1.
To complete the summoning task Alice must send systems sufficient to reconstruct the state
through each diamond. Consequently, completing a summoning task with diamonds {Di}
also completes an associated localize task with authorized regions Ai = Di. However, the
reverse is not true: completing the localize task implies some collection of systems inside
each authorized region can be used to construct the state, but doesn’t require that this
reconstruction can take place within the region. For instance, exhibiting the state could
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require the application of a high complexity circuit, perhaps requiring so many gates that
gravitational speed limits would prevent their completion in the required time. Further,
localize tasks deal with regions of arbitrary shape, whereas in a summoning task only causal
diamond shaped regions are discussed.
The basic restriction on when a summoning task may be completed comes from the
no-summoning theorem [11].
Theorem 16 A single-call single-return summoning task with two diamonds D1, D2 is
impossible whenever D1 and D2 are causally disjoint.
Proof. Suppose there exists a protocol that returns the state to r1 when there is a call to c1
and returns the state to r2 when there is a call to c2. Then we can argue such a protocol can
be used to clone a quantum state, and consequently no such protocol can exist. To see this,
suppose there is a call to both c1 and c2. Then, since D1 and D2 are causally disjoint, Alices
agent at D1 cannot distinguish this case from the case where c1 receives a call and c2 does
not. By assumption then she returns the state to r1. Similarly, Alices agent at D2 returns
the state at r2. Alice has then handed over two copies of the quantum state.
The proof of the no-summoning theorem is similar to the proof of the no-assembly
theorem we gave in the main text, see theorem 11.
Similar to the localize task, summoning is possible whenever each pair of diamonds are
causally connected and every diamond has a point in the future light cone of the start point.
Theorem 17 The single-call single-return summoning task is possible if and only if:
(i) The return point of each diamond is in the causal future of the start point.
(ii) Every pair of diamonds (Di, Dj) is causally connected.
We omit the proof of this theorem as it proceeds along now familiar lines: the many diamond
case is reduced to a two diamond case by use of an error-correcting code, which can be
constructed from the graph of causal connections among the regions. In the case of two
diamonds we complete the task using the teleportation protocol illustrated in figure A1.
The summoning task as given above is “single-call” in that exactly one of the bi = 1, and
“single-return” in that the state should be returned in full at the called-to diamond. We can
generalize this to allow for Alice to receive many calls (many bi = 1) in two possible ways.
First, we might specify that Alice return a subsystem at each called-to diamond such that
taken together these subsystems can be used to reproduce the state. In this case we have
weakened the requirement on Alice — she need not hand over the state itself, just quantum
information and classical instructions sufficient for Bob to later construct the state. We
will refer to this as many-call many-return summoning. Alternatively, we can specify that
Alice hand over the state itself at one (but any one) of the called-to diamonds. We call this
many-call single-return summoning. This second case is treated by Adlam and Kent [7] and
discussed further in Appendix B. The first case is closely related to the state-assembly task
and we elaborate on this relation in the remainder of this section.
Before proceeding, we can collect points in the last paragraph into a definition of the
many-call many-return summoning task.
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Figure A1: A summoning task on two diamonds in 2 + 1 dimensions. In this task r1 is in the
future light cone of c2, but r2 is not in the future of c1. (In all figures, red arrows indicate
causal curves.) Additionally, r1 and r2 are in the future light cone of s. To complete this
summoning task, Alice pre-shares entanglement between s and c1. At s, Alice teleports the
state ρ using the shared entanglement and then sends the classical teleportation data to both
r1 and r2. At c1, Alice routes the entangled particle she holds to r1 if she receives b1 = 1,
and routes the particle to r2 otherwise. This example is due to Kent [10].
Definition 18 A many-call many-return summoning task is a task involving two
interacting agencies, Alice and Bob. A task is defined by
(i) A quantum state ρ, known to Bob and unknown to Alice.
(ii) A start point s, at which Bob gives Alice ρ.
(iii) A collection of authorized sets {A1, ..., An} each consisting of one or more causal
diamonds, Ai = {Di1, ..., Diki}.
At the call point associated with each diamond Alice receives a bit bi from Bob. Alice has a
guarantee that the calls will be to one of the authorized sets of diamonds. Alice is required to
return a collection of classical and quantum systems at the associated ri which is sufficient
to reconstruct the quantum state ρ.
The definition of the many-call single return summoning task we postpone to Appendix B.
We characterize the many-call many-return summoning tasks which are possible and
those which are impossible in the following theorem.
Theorem 19 The many-call many-return summoning task is possible if and only if:
(i) The return point of at least one diamond from each authorized set is in the causal future
of the start point.
(ii) Every pair of authorized sets (Ai, Aj) is causally connected.
Again we omit the proof, which follows the pattern of using the error correcting code
constructed from the graph of causal connections to reduce the many authorized set case
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to the two authorized set case. In the case of two authorized sets we use that the sets are
causally connected, so in particular there exists a pair of causal diamonds chosen across the
sets which are causally connected. We then complete the summoning task on these two
diamonds using the teleportation protocol illustrated in figure A1.
From theorems 12 and 19 we find that state-assembly and summoning are possible
for exactly the same arrangements of authorized regions. This is interesting, as although
the tasks are similar, they have one key distinction. In summoning Alice holds an unknown
quantum state, so can’t produce copies of the state due to the linearity of quantum mechanics;
in state-assembly Alice holds a known quantum state, but has the additional requirement
that she hand over the state at most once. Thus, in the assembly task the requirement
that Alice hand the state over at most once replaces the no-cloning restriction. The state
Alice holds is essentially classical, since it is known to her and she may produce an arbitrary
number of copies, but this gives her no additional power. In this sense we can view the
state-assembly task as a classical analogue of the summoning task∗.
In the main article we discussed the state-assembly task with unauthorized regions. One
could also consider a generalization of the summoning task with unauthorized regions, but
this generalization is less well motivated. In particular, in the summoning task Bob both
gives the state to Alice and requests it from her. It is unclear in what circumstance Alice
would want to hide the state Bob gave to her from Bob when certain sets of calls are made.
In the assembly setting this is more natural, since Alice has herself prepared the state and
may want to hide it from certain subsets of other parties.
Appendix B. Many-call single-return summoning
In Appendix A we discussed the many-call many-return summoning task, which we found is
closely related to the state-assembly task discussed in the main article. Many-call many-
return summoning is also interesting from the viewpoint of spacetime localization. In
particular, completing the many-call many-return summoning task also completes the localize
task. However, a second generalization of summoning to include many-calls is possible: we
can consider a task with many calls but a single return, where Alice receives several calls
from Bob and must return the state in full at exactly one (but any one) of the called-to
diamonds.
We give a definition of the many-call single-return definition below.
Definition 20 A many-call single-return summoning task is a task involving two
interacting agencies, Alice and Bob, defined by:
(i) A quantum state ρ, known to Bob and unknown to Alice.
(ii) A start point s, at which Bob gives Alice ρ
∗ Shortly before the publication of this manuscript reference [9] appeared, which also discusses a classical
version of the summoning task and its relation to the quantum one.
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(iii) A collection of authorized sets {A1, ..., An} each consisting of one or more causal
diamonds, Ai = {Ai1, ..., Aiki}.
At the call point associated with each diamond Alice receives a bit bi from Bob. Alice has a
guarantee that calls will be to one of the authorized sets. To successfully complete the task,
Alice must return the state ρ at exactly one of the called to diamonds.
As defined here, the many-call single-return summoning task is somewhat more general than
the task considered by Adlam and Kent. They considered in particular the case where the
set of authorized sets {A1, ..., An} corresponds to every possible subset of the diamonds. We
refer to this as unrestricted-call single-return summoning.
Adlam and Kent characterized the full set of possible arrangements of diamonds for this
unrestricted-call single-return summoning task [7]. We recall their theorem here.
Theorem 21 (Adlam and Kent 15’) Summoning with unrestricted calls with the
requirement that Alice return the state at exactly one diamond is possible if and only if
the following two conditions are true:
(i) Every return point ri is in the future light cone of the start point s.
(ii) For any subset {Di1 , Di2 , ..., Din} of diamonds, there is at least one diamond Di∗ in the
subset for which ri∗ is in the future light cone of all the ci in the subset.
Interestingly, condition (ii) above is stronger than the corresponding condition for summoning
with a single call. Adlam and Kent used this fact to argue against our interpretation of
summoning in terms of localization of quantum information [7]; they argue that completing
the summoning task depends on some resource provided to Alice by Bob — a bit string of
the form 000...010...000 — and thus that Alice is not localizing the state to each diamond.
Instead, she is only successfully responding to the summons bi = 1 by exploiting her
knowledge that certain other calls are bj = 0.
The simplest case where the conditions of many-call single-return summoning and those
for many-call many-return summoning differ is the three diamond task shown in figure B1.
Consider the arrangement of diamonds shown there, and take any set of diamonds to be
authorized. Then to complete the many-call many-return task Alice encodes the state ρ into
a ((2, 3)) secret sharing scheme and sends one share to each of the call points ci. She then
routes each share according to the bits bi she receives at each point; if bi = 0 she forwards
the share to the next return point ri+1, while if bi = 1 she sends the share to the return point
ri. One can readily check that if one or two calls are sent two shares will end up at a single
return point, and the state is handed over at a single diamond.
However, if a call is sent to all three diamonds, only one share ends up at each diamond.
Indeed, Adlam and Kent showed that the unrestricted-call single-return task is impossible
on this three diamond arrangement. This is interesting, but we argue it does not indicate
that the state cannot be localized to each diamond, at least using the notion of localized we
employ in this article. In the protocol using the ((2,3)) secret sharing scheme, two shares
pass through each diamond when Bob sends no calls. Someone with full access to the region
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Figure B1: The three diamond task described in text. The known protocol for completing
this task makes use of quantum error-correction: The state is encoded into a ((2, 3)) secret
sharing scheme with one share sent to each of the call points ci. The shares are then routed
to ri+1 mod 3 if bi = 0, and to ri if bi = 1. This task is the simplest example of a summoning
task which Alice can complete if there is a guarantee Bob will make only one call, but not if
Bob may make an arbitrary number of calls.
enclosed by any one diamond can gather both these shares from the secret sharing scheme
and later use them to construct the state. Thus, in this sense the state is localized to all
three diamonds.
When Bob sends a call, however, he may prevent the state from being reproduced in
certain diamonds. This is obvious in a more prosaic example: Suppose we have two diamonds,
with a diamond D2 far in the causal future of the diamond D1. Then Bob giving a call to
D1 results in Alice handing the state over to Bob there, and so she does not produce the
state in diamond D2. One thing that is interesting about the three diamond task, as revealed
by Adlam and Kent, is that in some cases Bob’s calls can prevent the state from being
reproduced in any diamond. In particular this can happen in cases with cyclic connections
among diamonds, as in the three diamond task.
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